Securing the Global Freight Transportation

Written by Mr. Itay Levin

Prologue

The September 11 2001 terror attacks highlight the importance of securing the global transportation system from acts of unlawful interference.

It was not the first time terror had identified the aviation industry in particular as a quality target to present its message but this time it was a clear sound of alarm to nations around the world that something must be done or else their economy will be harmed significantly.

As times pass, other means of transportation were attacked like the trains in Madrid 2004 two times, London 2005 two times, New-York 2009 and other, but the aviation industry was always the preferred target to terror organizations.

A few months ago the Secretary of USA Department of Homeland Security secretary Napolitano told The Associated Press that the government sees more intelligence about threats to aviation than anything else.

The Israeli aviation was protected against acts of aviation terror for more than 43 years and using the cargo freight as a “Modus operandi” was a considerable threat.

But most courtiers and their governments didn’t share the same point of view and till recent years harming the aircraft using the freight was like using an open door.

Major Past Frieght Related Aircraft Bombing

On March 3rd, 1956 a Skyways Ltd. aircraft was destroyed on the ground when an explosion, caused by a time-bomb, occurred 20 minutes before the aircraft was due to depart from Nicosia Intl. Airport for the United Kingdom with 68 passengers.

On February 21, 1970 a Swissair flight SR330 left Zurich for Tel-Aviv, Israel, carrying 47 people. The jet suffered an explosion about nine minutes after take-off due to a barometric triggered bomb, that had been placed in the cargo hold. The aircraft crashed shortly thereafter with no survivors.

On the same day, a second bomb detonated aboard an Austrian Airlines airliner traveling from Frankfurt to Vienna. The bomb, located inside a mailbag due to be carried to Israel on a later flight, exploded about 20 minutes after take-off. Though a 0.6 m²  hole was torn in the bottom of the fuselage, the aircraft landed safely at Frankfurt.

On November 15th, 1979 American Airlines Flight AA444 carrying 78 people headed from Chicago to Washington DC. Thirty minutes into flight, a mail bomb hidden in a wooden box in the cargo hold ignited. The device produced large amounts of smoke but failed to detonate, due to a faulty timer. The pilot made a successful emergency landing, however several passengers had to be treated for smoke inhalation.

On September 9th, 1980 United Airlines Passengers were disembarking in Sacramento, California, when a small cardboard box in the cargo hold detonated. The explosion injured two cargo handlers but none of the 44 passengers and crew were harmed.

On May 3rd, 1986 Air Lanka Flight UL512 left London with stops in Zurich and Dubai before reaching Colombo, Sri Lanka. The aircraft, carrying 148, was parked at the terminal preparing to continue on to the Maldives Islands when an explosive concealed in an onboard cargo crate exploded. The blast ripped the plane in half killing 21 and injuring 41 people.

On January 5th, 1989 three packages containing bogus bombs were left for shipment at the cargo areas of three international airlines: TWA, Pan Am and Air France. The packages also contained a typed message: “Congratulations You have found our phony bomb!”

On 29 October 2010, officials discovered two packages addressed to organizations in Chicago, containing sophisticated bombs of approximately half kg of the explosive PETN each. The bombs were found aboard cargo planes, although each had also been carried on passenger flights before. The first was found on a UPS plane in the UK while the second was discovered aboard a FedEx aircraft at Dubai. Each was packaged within a printer toner cartridge and “the explosives discovered were of a sophisticated nature whereby they could not be detected by X-ray screening or trained sniffer dogs”. The devices were to be triggered by cell phone alarms while the planes were estimated to be over the Atlantic Ocean. Investigators believe the bombs were intended to destroy planes in flight, although it is unclear whether the perpetrators could have known whether they would be carried aboard passenger or freight aircraft. Both packages originated in Yemen and the organization Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is believed responsible.

 

Securing the Commercial Fright

Introduction

In 2007, the U.S Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act more commonly known as the 9/11 Act. This law requires that all cargo transported on a passenger aircraft be screened for explosives as of August 1, 2010.  Step by step from screening Nero body aircraft to screening all U.S outbound passenger planes TSA set an example to the world how to secure its aviation freight.

The unique about the U.S program is the way the government “recruited” the air freight industry to take part in the program:

  • Manufacturers
  • Warehouses
  • Distribution Centers
  • Third Party Logistics Providers
  • Indirect Air Carriers
  • Airport Cargo Handlers
  • Independent Cargo Screening Facilities
  • Air Carrier

It was the late Edward J. Kelly, the former head of the U.S. head of TSA’s cargo division & Former Emery International executive that enhances a trust, relationships between the agency and the “Industry-cooperative approach”.

 

Other countries and organizations like the UK’s DfT followed the US initiative in the same type of manner with a considerable local adaptation.

Two major solutions have been created:

  1. I. In-Direct-Air-Carriers Screening

An Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) means any entity not in possession of air carrier that engage indirectly in air transportation of property using of a passenger air carrier.

Each IAC has adopted a security program that try to meet TSA requirements under one of the certified programs.

That screening program was established to meet all the challenges facing the aviation industry trying to be capable of responding to both mandatory regulations and customer’s requirements.

This screening solution needs to provide a solution for all freight types, including:

  • All types of unit load devices (ULDs)
  • Environmentally controlled containers
  • Multiple or single skids
  • Palletized freight
  • Large and oversized crated items
  • Loose boxes and cartons
  • Specialized pharmaceuticals
  • Oversized machinery
  • Oil and gas equipment

  1. II.            Chain of Custody Standards
  • Supply chain participants are required to maintain chain of custody standards for screened cargo. The standards are separated into three categories, including:
  1. Documentation – Information must be documented and must travel with the shipment.
  2. Methods – Procedures must be employed to ensure that the integrity of the cargo is secure and maintained throughout the supply chain.
  3. Authentication – Documentation and methods must be authenticated upon receipt by each regulated party and processing point in the chain of custody.

Program Benefits

TSA indicated that “Screening 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft is designed to ensure the safety of the traveling public”, but more than that  TSA designed the programs “to provide businesses with the option to screen cargo in a cost effective manner and at various points of the supply chain”. TSA has indicated a few benefits:

  • Decreased log jams (carrier delays) and expedited supply chain flow
  • Ability to build bulk configurations
  • Ability to continue to ship certain cargo types without potentially invasive screening or manipulation later in the supply chain
  • Ability to maintain in-house packaging integrity
  • Risk-based
  • Efficient
  • Balanced regulatory approach
  • Interoperability
  • Sustainability
  • Internationally comparable

But do the programs answer the challenge set by the adversary?

Many experts are holding the idea that the taking control of all cargo aircraft is relatively attractive way to use it later as a guided bomb for two main reasons:

1. Given the recent increased security measures facing the passenger and baggage
2. Given the very lack security measures facing the adversary in freight domain

The threat even Increases significantly in case on the plane loaded hazardous materials.

If we will examine the last el-qaeda published attack from October 29th 2010 we can understand very clearly that the adversary knows the international security deployment very well, he knows the weak pointes and he is taking advantage of his knowledge.

What can we learn from the attack?

The adversary is determine and sophisticated trying to overcome multi-layers security system.

From Understanding to Protecting

When the late Mr. Kelly plans his security paradigm he structured his fundamental elements over the analysis of the years before 2007, very profitable years with huge volume of freight flying around the world. All aviation industry community suffered during 2007-2008 and for the freight those years was very “slow” years from commercial point of view and the flow of commerce was in very low volume. Ed could have screen 2007-2008 freight at the airport premises using the TSA- if he could know. During these years he could have accomplished the in-line automatic screening system for freight.

Out of the need to quickly secure the system a “bad decision out of worse” direction was chosen. That was the decision then but should it stay the same?

The ability to adapt security deployment to ever changing challenges and threats is a fundamental element for every security organization but can we ask non-professional security to make these changes? Can we change and adopt new protection element in a non-professional deployment without the adversary know about that?

 

Marking 10 years to 9-11 attacks the TSA administrator Mr. Pistole emphatically reminded attendees that TSA is redefining its mission to change the one-size-fits-all paradigm and move towards a more risk-based, intelligence-driven security approach or in his own words “We’ve got to reduce the size of the haystack in order to find the needle.” Why choosing one approach to flying the tickets holders and another to Air waybills? It must be the same approach! There is no other than treat-oriented screening concept.

Epilogue

Protecting the aviation industry from harming using the commercial freight flying on board is just as critical as scrutiny of passengers and their baggage. The cargo hold must not be left as the vulnerable point and the weakest point in the chain of security.

Written by Mr. Itay Levin

Mr. Levin is an expert in the area of protective security with extensive experience in aviation security, security systems management, critical infrastructure and corporate protection. Mr. Levin’s experience is based on his past work managing international aviation security systems spread over a wide geographical area for ELAL Airlines Security.  His responsibilities included managing the officers in charge and supervising projects and large scale operations.  He was responsible for hundreds of employees and thousands of day-to-day security operations in a highly competitive commercial environment for 10 years, many of them during an era of high profile terror attacks.  This unique combination of maintaining the highest security standards while taking the needs of the commercial environment into consideration are what helped to make him unique in the industry and a leader in the field.

Written by Mr. Itay Levin

Mr. Levin  is an expert in the area of protective security with extensive experience in aviation security, security systems management, critical infrastructure and corporate protection. Mr. Levin’s experience is based on his past work managing international aviation security systems spread over a wide geographical area for ELAL Airlines Security.  His responsibilities included managing the officers in charge and supervising projects and large scale operations.  He was responsible for hundreds of employees and thousands of day-to-day security operations in a highly competitive commercial environment for 10 years, many of them during an era of high profile terror attacks.  This unique combination of maintaining the highest security standards while taking the needs of the commercial environment into consideration are what helped to make him unique in the industry and a leader in the field.

 

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